Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the Issue of Law Making by Trifunovska, S.M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/131591
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the
Issue of Lawmaking
Mia Swart, Judges and lawmaking at the international criminal tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
Diss. Leiden, promotor prof.
dr. C.J.R. Dugard, Leiden:
Leiden University 2006.
A PhD thesis by Mia Swart, ‘Judges
and Lawmaking at the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (published
in 2006), discusses the lawmaking
by the two ad hoc Tribunals in the
context of international criminal law.
The object of her study is not to es-
tablish whether judicial lawmaking
should or should not be permitted,
but rather to consider the peculiari-
ties of international criminal law and
the particular context of the ad hoc
Tribunals. After previously dealing
with a number of issues (such as the
circumstances under which the Tri-
bunals were created, various types
of their jurisdiction, issue of judicial
lawmaking, judicial independence at
the Tribunals and the institutional
culture at the Tribunals, the princi-
ple of legality, relevant jurisprudence
reflecting lawmaking by the Tribu-
nals as well as rule-making), Swart
draws conclusions both supporting
and opposing judicial lawmaking at
the Tribunals. Among the arguments
in favour she considers the unwrit-
ten rudimentary nature of interna-
tional criminal law which contains
indeterminate rules and as such crea-
tes conditions for judges of the Tri-
bunals to be ‘builders of a system’.
Another argument is the human-
isation of humanitarian law which
extends the application of humanitar-
ian law to new, previously unaffec-
ted areas. Also the acceptance of the
lawmaking by the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals is a historical argu-
ment in favour of accepting the law-
making by the two ad hoc Tribunals.
At the same time a number of argu-
ments in support of judicial caution
are offered, for example the fact that
lawmaking might pose a direct chal-
lenge to the principle of legality; the
need for accountability of the Tribu-
nals; and the fact that the ICTY and
ICTR are criminal tribunals which
‘merge “profoundly consensual”
body of international law with the
“profoundly coercive” nature of
domestic criminal law’. While one
of the cornerstones of criminal pro-
ceedings are the rights of accused
such a mixed procedure can affect
the requirements of fair trial.
The goal of this article is not to pro-
vide a systematic and detailed com-
ment on the Swart’s study and to be
a book review in its usual sense. Its
goal is rather to discuss some of the
aspects regarding the concept of
lawmaking dealt with by Swart, to
identify certain shortcomings and to
challenge the author’s perception on
some of the particularities of ad hoc
Tribunals and their impact on the
lawmaking activity.
1. Introduction
Obviously, international lawmaking
is one of the most challenging and
controversial issues in international
law doctrine. It is clear that it con-
cerns constitutive process which
brings about the creation of interna-
tional norms. But there are many
other questions which are not quite
clear. For example, it is not quite
obvious what international lawmak-
ing actually means, in which situa-
tions it can take place, who is enti-
tled to be international lawmaker
and, what are the consequences of
‘unauthorized’ lawmaking. Unlike
in national legal systems, in interna-
tional legal system there is no divi-
sion of powers among legislative,
executive and judicial branches in
which it is the legislative which
adopts legislation, the executive
which executes and the judiciary
which interprets and adjudicates.
International lawmaking has never
been an easy or uncomplicated pro-
cess. This has been the case also
when States had a monopolistic po-
sition in making international law.
Today the complexity of lawmaking
is ever increasing. There are various
factors which contribute to it, such
as the appearance – in addition to
States – of other international partic-
ipants or actors; the broadening of
cooperation in many different areas
of life (politics, economics, human
rights, health, industry development,
environment, disarmament, etc); the
increasing variety of instruments
which are used for that purpose; and
the increasing number of different
processes for which lawmaking is
carried out. ‘The complexity of
contemporary international relations
and the changing international envi-
ronment [… have] generated argu-
ments in favour of expansion of
lawmaking process, as well as of the
forms and substance of international
regulation’.1 Therefore, besides
States, international organizations
and international (semi-)judicial
bodies appear as lawmakers, as well.
The influence of international orga-
nizations has been especially signifi-
cant in this respect. They have
transformed the sources of interna-
tional law and their content, the
principal lawmaking actors, ‘and
even our understanding of what
“international law” is and what it
means to “comply” with its rules’.2
In addition, international organiza-
tions have encouraged various actors
(such as indigenous peoples, transna-
tional networks and NGO’s) to
produce international rules.3 Similar-
ly, international judicial bodies
emerged as important factor in inter-
national lawmaking. In 2004 some
125 international judicial bodies and
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mechanisms with astonishing diver-
sity have been identified.4 Many of
them have been established by brief
constitutional documents and/or in
the fields of law which are impreci-
sely or insufficiently regulated. Even
if this has not been the case, the dy-
namics of social development poses
on courts the necessity to take into
consideration new social develop-
ments taking place on the interna-
tional scene. These are some of the
reasons for their increasing role in
lawmaking. This is true also for the
ad hoc criminal Tribunals on Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda which have appe-
ared as significant lawmakers in the
field of international criminal law.
It is not yet quite clear which is the
scope of the impact of their jurispru-
dence on the emergence of new inter-
national rules. However, it is ob-
vious that they have generated and
accelerated an irreversible process
in the field of individual criminal
responsibility regarding the creation
of both norms and institutions such
as the permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) and its Stat-
ute adopted in 1998.
2. Two views on the law-
making function of
international courts:
principal and accepted
Any discussion on lawmaking by
the two ad hoc Criminal Tribunals
makes part of a broader story on
lawmaking function of international
judicial bodies which again makes
part of even broader story on inter-
national lawmaking. And within
these general and more general
stories there are some basic and
common questions that deserve at-
tention. One of them is the question
of the definition of international
lawmaking or, in other words, what
can be called as international lawmak-
ing. As many terms in international
law, this one too has no clearly defi-
ned meaning though the authors use
it frequently and in different con-
texts. In its general meaning the term
lawmaking is defined as: enacting or
making laws, and law-maker is the
one ‘who makes or enacts laws; a
legislator, also called lawgiver’.5
Some have defined it as ‘the imposi-
tion of binding legal obligations’ and
others as ‘the prescription of general
rules that are applicable to all, and
which are meant to remain in force
for an indefinite period of time’.6
Mia Swart does not discuss the con-
cept of international lawmaking in
its broader meaning but goes imme-
diately into discussion about the
concept of judicial lawmaking in
order to focus further on the issues
of relevance for the ad hoc Tribu-
nals. This seems to be a proper ap-
proach as ‘it is difficult to generalise
about judicial decision-making
without regard, inter alia to the
particular tribunal, its institutional
setting, the context of the dispute,
the identity of the parties and the
makeup of the decision-making bo-
dy. […] [A]ny consideration of inter-
national lawmaking must take ac-
count of this proliferation and consi-
der the contribution of courts and
tribunals in very different sectors of
international law’.7
2.1. What does judicial law-
making mean?
So, what does judicial lawmaking or
judicial legislation mean? When and
how does it take place? Official in-
stances on international level will
never clearly admit that judges of
international courts and tribunals
make law. This principal or ‘politi-
cally correct’ view holds that inter-
national courts interpret and apply
law but do not make it. ‘It is natural
that members of a legal tribunal
should incline to dismiss with some
vigour the suggestion that they have
indulged in acts of legislation.’8 In
the time of the Permanent Court of
International Justice it was held that
doctrine and jurisprudence only as-
sist in determining rules and serve
only for elucidation of these rules.9
Decades later similar view was as-
sumed by the International Court
of Justice (ICJ). In its Advisory
Opinion on theLegality of the Thre-
at orUse of NuclearWeapons (1992)
it held that the task of the Court is
‘to engage in its normal judicial
function of ascertaining the existence
or otherwise of legal principles […].
[I]t states the existing law and does
not legislate. This is so even if, in
stating and applying the law, the
Court necessarily has to specify its
scope and sometimes note its general
trend’.10 The limits to the law-ma-
king function of the Court are
clearly posed by Article 58 accord-
ing to which the decision of the
Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect
to that particular case, taken in con-
junction with Article 38 (1d) estab-
lishing that judicial decisions are
subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law. Similarly, States
do not accept a lawmaking function
of international courts. They are
‘ready to increase the number and
scope of tribunals but [are] less wil-
ling to acknowledge the possibility
of judicial lawmaking.’11 Since
judges are not permitted ‘to establish
law independently of an existing
legal system, institution or norm’;
they can only ‘declare what can be
logically inferred from the raison
d’être of a legal system, institution
or norm’.12 Any other capacity attri-
buted to international courts would
be incompatible with their basic
function to adjudicate and would be,
at least declaratory, contrary to the
purposes for which they are establis-
hed and therefore would also be
discouraging for States both to sub-
mit cases to existing courts and to
create new courts in the future.
There is, however, another view
which admits the lawmaking func-
tion of international courts. This
view is broadly accepted by indivi-
dual judges of international courts
as well as various authors and in
some cases also by States. Tom
Ginsburg mentions the example of
the ICJ Oil Platform case and the
concern expressed in the pleadings
by the USA that a decision of the
Court might restrict its ability to
protect merchant shipping around
the world as well as the fact that
States often at various times sought
the power to intervene in cases to
which they are not an immediate
party, but might be affected should
the principle at issue become law.13
Some authors hold the view that
States often tacitly delegate lawmak-
ing authority to courts but they do
not want to acknowledge this delega-
tion ‘in order both to perpetuate the
fiction of state hegemony over inter-
national norm generation and to
provide a shield behind which inter-
national courts can make law with-
out suffering paralyzing political
pressure that would negate their
ability to do so.’14
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Judges of the International Court of
Justice acknowledge the lawmaking
function of the Court as well. It is
rather impossible, though, to hear a
judge saying that the Court lays
down mandatory rules in the same
way as any national legislature.
Hersch Lauterpacht, whose work is
‘a benchmark, an intellectual para-
digm encapsulating an approach to
international law which has been
profoundly influential’15 and who,
from 1955-1960, served as a Judge
in ICJ, basically held the view that
international tribunals ‘when giving
a decision on a point of international
law […] state what the law is. Their
decisions are evidence of the existing
rule of law.’16 However, at the same
time he admitted that courts have a
lawmaking function by saying that
‘[t]he denial on the part of the Court
or of individual Judges of any inten-
tion to legislate is legitimate and
proper. Any contrary attitude would
constitute usurpation of powers –
doubly dangerous in international
sphere. This does not mean that they
have been able to avoid decisions of
legislative character. […] Judicial
legislation, so long as it does not as-
sume the form of a deliberate disre-
gard of the existing law, is a pheno-
menon both healthy and unavoida-
ble.’17 Therefore, ‘the fact remains
that judicial law-making is a perma-
nent feature of administration of
justice in every society’18, thus in
international society or community
too. Accordingly Lauterpacht devo-
ted in his writings considerable atten-
tion to what he called ‘judicial legis-
lation’ which is conceived not as a
process of making new law but ‘as
a process of changing the existing
law’.19
But the discussion on all different
views does not explain what judicial
lawmaking means. One misses a
clear answer to this question also in
the Swart’s book, although she
makes a number of good points in
this respect. It can be inferred from
her analysis that lawmaking, among
other things, means filling the gaps
or lacunae in existing rules that the
court needs to apply. Or, it can also
be ‘adventurous interpretation’ of
existing rules, like the ICTY did in
the Tadić case. Accordingly, she
notes: ‘Interpretation will only con-
stitute lawmaking if interpretation
serves to fill a gap in the law or to
extend the law to new areas’ (Swart
p. 58).20
Obviously, a more concrete conclu-
sion in this respect is needed. It is so
that the basic function of internation-
al courts is and will be to adjudicate.
This includes certain degree of judi-
cial discretion which according to
traditional view is the authority to
make a choice between two or more
conceivable lawful alternatives.21 The
assumption of a lawmaking or legis-
lating function by the courts takes
place when they in their decision-
making depart from the normative
preferences which the legislator had
at the time the norm was accepted.22
Reasons for such a departure can be
different. Judicial lawmaking takes
place when the courts cannot find
answers in the pre-existing rules.
Judges make law in the situations
either when the underlying treaties
are old and there is little prospect
for their revision, or when the under-
lying conditions have changed23, or
when there is lacunae or gap in the
existing sources of international law.
Lauterpacht has identified five such
situations in which ICJ legislates: (a)
The Court might introduce certain
though not drastic judicial novelty
while applying a general principle
of law; (b) Judicial legislation can
also take place by reference to paral-
lel developments in international law
– when the Court gives ‘general and
articulate formulation to develop-
ments implicit, though as yet not
clearly accepted, in actual interna-
tional custom or agreement of
States.’24 An example of the ICJ
lawmaking is the pronouncement of
the Court as result of the discrepan-
cy which exists between the predo-
minant doctrine accepting States as
the only and exclusive subjects of
international law and practice which
reveals other entities acting as sub-
jects of international law; (c) The
third situation in which the Court
legislates takes place when it renders
decisions of a general nature in the
absence of the rules that can serve as
ground for decisions; (d) In some
cases the Court legislates by depart-
ing from rigid customary or conven-
tional rules because ‘of theflexibility
that ought to characterise interna-
tional relations’.25 This takes place
mostly with regard to procedural
and jurisdictional questions; (e) And,
finally, the fifth situation of ICJ ju-
dicial legislation concerns adjudica-
tion ex aequo et bono (an ancient
concept according to which the
court decides according to what is
fair and in good conscience) by giv-
ing interpretation beyond the exist-
ing law.26
Are other international courts diffe-
rent in this respect from the ICJ?
Not really! If faced with similar sit-
uations regarding the pre-existing
law and the requirements posed
upon them they will embark on leg-
islation in order to fulfil their duties.
This goes also for the ad hoc Tribu-
nals. The international criminal law
system with which the ad hocTribu-
nals are concerned, is a young legal
order in constant flux and with lacu-
nae and gaps in the pre-existing law.
Swart mentions briefly that the Tri-
bunals have applied general princi-
ples of law and have drawn from
parallel developments in other areas.
This has happened most frequently
with regard to developments in inter-
national humanitarian law and hu-
man rights law. The Tribunals have
also often relied on the flexible na-
ture of international criminal law
and when ‘there has been no gener-
ally accepted rule in international
law (such as the definition of rape
for example) they have gone beyond
the interpretation of existing law to
create new law.’ Similarly, in the
Tadić case27 ‘[b]y finding that the
Bosnian Serbs acted as de facto
agents of another state [the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia], (that was
necessary to qualify the conflict as
international), the Appeals Chamber
[of the ICTY] expanded the scope
of protection of humanitarian law’
that was of a crucial importance in
order to try Dušan Tadić for grave
breaches of Geneva Conventions
(Swart, p. 63-64).
But only departing from the legisla-
tor’s preferences is not enough to
create or develop a new or different
norm of international law. The sur-
vival of so created norm will depend
very much on the authority that the
lawmaking court enjoys and on its
acceptance by the international
community. The acceptance can be
reflected in States’ expression of
support and in the decisions of other
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international (including judicial)
bodies and institutions. So, if one
comes to the (correct) conclusion
that the ad hoc Tribunals have as-
sumed law making function in cer-
tain cases because they interpreted
the existing norms of humanitarian
or human rights law by departing
from the legislator’s normative
preferences, it still does not mean
that they have created an internation-
al rule or that their lawmaking is
significant. The following step is
needed and that is to see whether
and to which extent there will be
international acceptance of that law.
It can happen that ‘states routinely
ignore the norms pronounced by
international courts, then their
source as generator of international
rules becomes much less promising’
or ‘decisions by international judges
push far beyond what states are wil-
ling to tolerate and states begin to
reject the newly-created rules, then
an international court’s usefulness
as a lawmaking device evaporates’.28
In other words, ‘[i]f States (and
other international actors) accept the
decisions of international courts and
build practice around them then
their lawmaking impact is substanti-
al, […] if they do not, the decision
may become marginalized, seen as
exceptional and have minimal law-
making effect.’29 The discussion on
the evidence concerning the accep-
tance or refusal of adjudication by
the ad hoc Tribunals is an aspect
which one misses in the Swart’s
publication.
2.2. Judicial lawmaking,
judicial legislation or
judicial activism?
Swart emphasizes that judicial law-
making is often (negatively) de-
scribed as judicial legislation. The
process of lawmaking through legis-
lating requires value judgments,
which by nature of their subjectivi-
ty, is also political. She starts from
the premise that there is a sharp divi-
sion of functions comparable to na-
tional legal systems in which the le-
gislature makes the law, the execu-
tive enforces it and the judiciary in-
terprets it. Accordingly, she consi-
ders that ‘because legislating is poli-
tical it should be done by elected
officials operating under a norm of
accountability to their constituen-
cies’. Adjudication, on the other
hand, ‘must be justified in two ways:
First, by appeal to a norm produced
by the democratic decision-making
process embodied in legislation and,
secondly, by the application of a
norm to the facts in a process that is
independent of the decision-making
process that generated it’. In her
view, judicial legislation is problema-
tic because it violates these require-
ments (Swart, p. 57-58). ‘[L]awma-
king, when understood as develop-
ment of international law, is a good
thing. If, however, lawmaking takes
the form of judicial legislation it
seems less desirable. It is not clear
[…] where development ends and
legislating begins’ (Swart, p. 82).
Such a conclusion might suggest that
there is a difference between the
concepts of judicial lawmaking and
judicial legislation and – one can add
to this – judicial activism, as well.
This difference should be reflected
in the lawmaking intensity in sub-
stantive sense. According to this, a
low-level lawmaking which is short
of creation of new a law, but is
maybe a slightly different interpreta-
tion of the existing law ‘by applying
or extending established rules to
novel circumstances and by altering
the content of legal rules in accordan-
ce with changed economic and social
circumstances’30, can be called ‘devel-
opment of law’. Beyond that, courts
would act as judicial legislators or,
even worse – judicial activists. Ac-
cording to Ronald Sackville in Au-
stralia ‘the expression “judicial acti-
vism” has become a political slogan,
carrying distinctly pejorative overto-
nes. In contemporary discourse […]
the expression is frequently used in
a derogatory sense to describe judi-
cial lawmaking, especially of consti-
tutional dimensions, which reflects
the personal (usually liberal) policy
preferences of unelected judges
rather than a neutral application by
them of established principles.
[…T]he expression implies that activ-
ist judges exceed the proper limits
of the judicial function and indeed,
usurp the democratic authority of
elected Parliaments.’31 This might be
comparable to the notion of judicial
legislation or activism of internation-
al courts where similar factors might
play role. The problem with all these
‘nuances’ of judicial lawmaking is
that it is difficult to establish, as
Swart correctly mentions, when one
stops and the other begins. For the
ad hoc Tribunals it is difficult to say
whether in the exercise of their
power they make law, legislate or
act as judicial activists. There is no
monitoring mechanism or criteria
that could be used to establish the
situations of far-reaching judicial
lawmaking. There is also no system
of accountability for judicial aspects
of functioning of international
courts. The qualification will depend
on the public perception. The only
possibility for States is, as above
pointed out, to individually or col-
lectively (through different institu-
tions) provide an appropriate reacti-
on to judicial lawmaking in case of
their disagreement or agreement
with it, expressed by ignoring or
enhancing a decision of the court.
This goes also for the ad hoc Tribu-
nals. In the literature there is a nota-
ble criticism on their work and jud-
gements. They are seen as too costly,
too inefficient and too ineffective
and it seems impossible today to
envisage the establishment a tribunal
of the same type in new situations.32
But there are many more of those
who support the Tribunals and see
them as legitimate and their decisi-
ons as exemplary and binding.
3. The creation of the
Tribunals and their law-
making function
Unlike other courts and tribunals
the ad hocTribunals present an inter-
esting and unique case with respect
to both the manner of and the pur-
poses for which they were created.
An international court is usually
created with an agreement or treaty.
The Tribunals were, however, esta-
blished by resolutions of the UN
Security Council.33 The basis for
their creation is Chapter VII (En-
forcement action) and Article 29 of
the UN Charter that gives the power
to Security Council to create ‘such
subsidiary bodies as it deems neces-
sary for the performance of its
functions’. This unique manner of
their establishment has been chosen
by the Security Council for the spe-
cific purpose which the Tribunals
were supposed to fulfil in the field
of peace and security.
With regard to a number of features
the Tribunals can be compared to
ICJ. All three – the two ad hoc Tri-
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bunals and ICJ – are judicial bodies
and make part of the UN Organiza-
tion. However, at least in two re-
spects they are very different: (a)
with respect to their legal position
within the UN Organization, and
(b) with respect to the main aims of
their functioning. The ICC is one of
the five principal organs of the Uni-
ted Nations and with respect to its
position within the UN system it is
equal to other UN main organs such
as the General Assembly or the Secu-
rity Council. It can be considered as
one of the instruments for securing
peace ‘in so far as this aim can be
achieved through law’, however ‘it
would be exaggeration to assert that
the Court has proved to be a signifi-
cant instrument for maintaining in-
ternational peace’.34 In his view the
ICJ is rather an agency for develop-
ing international law. The Tribunals
are not of a permanent nature and
their primary function is not to de-
velop law but were established as
agencies for securing peace and secu-
rity through the application of law.
They were created upon the determi-
nation of the Security Council that
widespread and flagrant violations
of international humanitarian law
‘continues to constitute threat to in-
ternational peace and security’.35 The
manner of creation indicates that the
Tribunals are in the function of
peace and security and are supposed
to be under the direct supervision of
the Security Council. This notwith-
standing the fact that the General
Assembly approves the annual bud-
get of the Tribunals, permanent and
ad litem judges are elected by the
General Assembly upon recommen-
dation of the Security Council and
annual reports are submitted to the
General Assembly. Also the fact that
in their judicial function they are
independent from any other authori-
ty does not affect their de jure status
of subsidiary bodies. As such Tribu-
nals should serve the purposes of the
Security Council and fulfil a func-
tion which is different from all other
international – including criminal –
courts and tribunals that are not es-
tablished as measures of enforce-
ment but as adjudicatory bodies.
Obviously, their creation is surroun-
ded by peculiarities regarding the
circumstances and conditions under
which they were established. Do all
these facts have some impact on the
legislative function of the Tribunals?
Yes and no.
One could assume that such a posi-
tion of the Tribunals imposes upon
them a requirement for less caution
or judicial hesitation with regard to
applicable law. This notwithstanding
the fact that it was clearly empha-
sized by the Secretary General that
being of judicial nature the Tribunals
have to perform their functions inde-
pendently of political considerations
and are not subject to the authority
or control of the Security Council
with regard to performance of judi-
cial functions.36
This is one of the points that calls
for analysis and comments missing
in the Swart’s study. While she dis-
cusses in Chapter One the creation
of the Tribunals and the challenges
to the legality of their creation, she
does not offer a view on whether or
how the manner of their creation
and their position of subsidiary
bodies of the Security Council has
affected their lawmaking function.
What one would be interested to
read is how come that the Security
Council could create a subsidiary
body to which it explicitly delegat-
ed, albeit limited, lawmaking power.
In the broad discussion that has
taken place in the past on the legality
of the Security Council decisions
regarding the creation of Tribunals
as bodies carrying out judicial func-
tions which it itself does not have,
one easily forgets that the UN, its
bodies and its specialized agencies
neither were conceived to have any
legislative powers themselves. Their
objectives would be carried out
mainly through recommendations
aimed at coordinating or harmoniz-
ing the actions of their member
States.37 So, in the past the Security
Council limited itself to the debates
and it was only when it started with
a broader analysis of the factors in-
fluencing peace and security that it
started to broaden its mandate and
‘is now assuming not only powers
of action but also legislative powers
in the interest of international peace
and security’.38 Some recent exam-
ples of the exercise of legislative
powers by the Security Council are
its resolution 1373 (2001) adopted
in the field of counter-terrorism and
resolution 1540 (2004) on non-pro-
liferation of weapons of mass de-
struction both creating general obli-
gations for all States. So, considered
in the light of new realities and
threats to peace and security, the as-
sumption of legislative powers by
the Security Council in the field of
peace and security is not necessarily
negative. As Judge Tanaka pointed
out ‘we […] must recognize that so-
cial and individual necessity consti-
tutes one of the guiding factors for
the development of law by the way
of interpretation as well as legisla-
tion’.39
During the preparatory stage of the
creation of the ICTY the UN Secre-
tary General has stressed that the
Tribunal would have a task to prose-
cute persons responsible for serious
violations of conventional and cus-
tomary international humanitarian
law and not to legislate that law.40
In his Report issued in 1993 he em-
phasized that in order to respect the
principle of legality which is reflec-
ted in the Latin maxim nullum cri-
men sine lege, the Tribunals should
apply rules of international humani-
tarian law ‘which are beyond any
doubt part of customary law so that
the problem of adherence of some
but not all states to specific conven-
tions does not arise’.41 Further in the
Report the Secretary General speci-
fied that the part of the conventional
international humanitarian law
which has beyond doubt become
part of customary law is the law ap-
plicable to armed conflict and embo-
died in the 1949 Geneva Conventi-
ons for the protection of war vic-
tims, the 1907 Hague Convention
(IV) respecting the Laws and Cust-
oms of War and the Regulations an-
nexed thereto, the 1948 Convention
on the Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide and the 1945 Charter of
the International Military Tribunal.42
Suggestions to apply domestic law
in so far it incorporates international
humanitarian law were not accepted
as it was considered that the existing
rules of international humanitarian
law embodied in the above-mentio-
ned documents provide sufficient
basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Canadian proposal to specify
the ICTY Statute as to include the
exact offences under the laws of war
and the mens rea to be proved by
the Prosecutor in each of the crimes,
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was also refused. So, the Statutes of
both Tribunals remained brief, with
a rather limited number of provisi-
ons and do not contain any but one
provision on the law which the Tri-
bunals should apply. ‘As enacted by
the Security Council, the ICTY [and
also ICTR] Statute resembled the
bold outlines of a coloring book:
much remained for judges to fill
in.’43 The only exception in that
sense was made with regard to penal-
ties in determining of which the
Trial Chambers shall have recourse
to the general practice regarding
prison sentences in the national
courts of the former Yugoslavia or
Rwanda. Identical approach was
taken with regard to the ICTR.44
However, both Statutes contain a
provision (Articles 15 ICTY and 14
ICTR) explicitly delegating lawmak-
ing function to the Tribunals giving
them capacity to adopt rules of pro-
cedure and evidence.
So, one can ask whether it was the
intention of the Security Council to
delegate the lawmaking power to the
ad hocTribunals? No doubt that the
Security Council – acting on behalf
of the international community –
was aware of the rudimentary nature
of international criminal law that
would make the lawmaking by the
Tribunals unavoidable and probably
also desirable. States present in the
Security Council were most likely
conscious that the Tribunals would
engage in lawmaking even if they
did not specifically create them for
that purpose. However, they did not
react either because the Tribunals
were of an ad hoc nature with limit-
ed temporal and territorial jurisdic-
tion or ‘States’ public refusal to rec-
ognize this possibility […] provided
them with the ability to denounce
the Tribunals later on, should the
courts reach a decision with which
States disagreed.’45 The Preliminary
Report of the Independent Commis-
sion of Experts on the humanitarian
situation in Rwanda established by
the UN Secretary General in 1994
noted that the creation of the Tribu-
nal was not only a matter of ensur-
ing justice in respect of atrocities
that have already been perpetrated,
but also a matter of deterrence for
the future. It also noted that ‘[t]he
coherent development of internation-
al criminal law better to deter such
crimes from being perpetrated in
future not only in Rwanda but any-
where would best be fostered by in-
ternational prosecution rather than
by domestic courts’.46 During the
discussion of the ICTR in the Secu-
rity Council Argentina highlighted
that the tribunal was ‘not autho-
rized’ to create rules of international
law or to legislate as regards such
law, but rather it is to apply existing
law.47 However ‘[t]here is little legis-
lative history for the ICTR, so it is
not clear on what basis the Security
Council made determination that
customary international law pro-
vides for individual criminal respon-
sibility in civil wars’, which brings
us to the conclusion that ‘[i]n the
light of the ground-breaking nature
of the idea of the international pro-
secution of crimes committed in civil
wars, [the statement of Argentina]
was either breathtakingly disinge-
nuous or profoundly ill-informed’.48
This all indicates to the fact that by
not specifying in great detail the
provisions of the Statutes (because
of the urgency of the issue, the ab-
sence of interest and will of the
States sitting in the Council or be-
cause of its own inability) the Secu-
rity Council in a way demanded the
law to be created at some later date,
like sometimes happens in national
legal systems.49
All the above-said carries the mes-
sage that, despite the fact that the
Tribunals live now their own ‘judici-
ally independent life’ the manner of
their creation and their perceived
function and purposes can still not
be explained and considered isolated
from their parent body, the Security
Council and the role it (has) played.
It is pity that Swart did not devote
some attention to this question in
her thesis.
4. Conclusion
Finally, a small critical remark on
the publication as such, is needed.
The subject of the study prepared
by Mia Swart is not only interesting
but also very important. There is an
obvious tendency towards global
expansion of judicial power both on
national and international levels.
However, in the book a reader will
only partly find the things he ex-
pects to read. Swart understands
lawmaking by the ad hoc Tribunals
in its broadest meaning that includes
discussion on all different aspects of
the working of the Tribunals, such
as the financing of the Tribunals
(and for some reasons also of ICC)
or the ‘courtroom aesthetics’ explain-
ing how the ICTY courtroom looks
like. On a number of places the rea-
der does not get the message about
the importance of the chapter or
discussion she includes for the topic
of the thesis. Such an example is the
discussion about the ‘common law
lawmaking’ (Chapter Two, under
6). Missing a strict focus on lawmak-
ing the publication is in a way about
everything what concerns the work
of the Tribunals. But there are also
valuable chapters such as the one
discussing the principle of legality
and the detailed analysis of the case
law of the Tribunals.
Notwithstanding these critical re-
marks one can appreciate the book’s
contribution to the opening of the
academic discussion on judicial law-
making in the field of international
criminal law. At this moment it is
the only monograph that has been
published on the particular topic of
lawmaking function of the ad hoc
Tribunals.50 And, in general, ‘there
has been little sustained scholarly
examination of law-making.51 Most
attention has been focused on inter-
nal consistency of the body of inter-
national law, namely whether the
proliferation of tribunals threatens
the coherence of international law’.52
So, it should be expected that the
judicial lawmaking of the criminal
tribunals will gain increasing atten-
tion in the future due to the com-
mencement of the ICC work and
genuine interest of States to streng-
then the norms of international hu-
manitarian law and of individual
criminal responsibility.
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